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Remembering With and Without Awareness in a Depressed Mood: 
Evidence of Deficits in Initiative 
Paula T. Hertel and Tammy S. Hardin 
Trinity University 
We propose that depressive deficits in remembering are revealed in tasks that allow the sponta­
neous use of strategies; tasks that bypass or direct the use of strategies should not produce 
depressive deficits. College students received depressive- or neutral-mood inductions after an­
swering questions worded to reflect homophones' less common meaning. After the inductions, 
subjects spelled old and new homophones and showed no effect of the depressive inductions on 
unaware memory for the old homophones. Subsequent tests of recognition did, however, reveal 
differences according to the induced mood or the presence of naturally occurring depression (in 
Experiment 3). The differences, evidence of nondepressed subjects' use of strategies, tended to 
disappear when all subjects were provided with strategies for spelling or recognition. The results 
indicate that depressives experience deficits in cognitive initiative. We review the literature on 
depressive memory from this perspective. 
Problems with memory are typical of depression, so much 
so that they are included among diagnostic criteria for depres­
sion (see Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978). Yet a review of 
the literature on depressed people's performance in memory 
tasks does not reveal consistent findings for depressive deficits. 
How can this inconsistency be understood? We propose that 
depression inhibits cognitive initiative. Depressed persons do 
not spontaneously use strategies or engage in the types of 
elaborative thinking that produce good performance in typical 
memory tasks, but they are capable of doing so when they are 
directed. 
We identify three categories of conditions for the use of 
strategies that benefit performance in memory tasks: sponta­
neous, directed, or bypassed. The spontaneous use of strategies 
occurs when processing is not well controlled by the design of 
the task. It happens when subjects organize without direction, 
for example, or when they notice relations to extratask knowl­
edge, or when they simply continue to rehearse when they are 
not required to do. According to our account of depressive 
deficits, deficits will occur when subjects can spontaneously 
elect strategies that are not specified in the task. Directing the 
use of strategies can raise the performance of the depressed 
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subjects, as well as the performance of the nondepressed 
subjects who do not spontaneously elect them, to comparable 
levels. Bypassing the use of strategies in tasks that benefit 
from their use (by concealing the nature of the task, for 
example) can lower the performance of depressed and non­
depressed subjects to comparable levels by affecting the non­
depressed subjects more than the depressed subjects. 
We think that this account pertains to a number of findings 
on deficits from natural and induced depression. Selected 
examples of research on deficits produced by mood inductions 
and deficits observed in naturally depressed individuals are 
reviewed in the general discussion. At this point, however, to 
clarify our notion of the role of initiative in depressive mem­
ory, we compare the initiative account with the resource­
allocation hypothesis (see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979). 
A number of researchers have proposed that deficits in 
remembering are due to a reduction in cognitive capacity in 
college students who experience mood induction (e.g., Ellis, 
Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984), in college students who report 
depression (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979), and in patients who 
experience minor or major depression (e.g., Roy-Byrne, Wein­
gartner, Bierer, Thompson, & Post, 1986). This view is derived 
from the assumption that there is a limit on the amount of 
resources available for performing mental operations (e.g., 
James, 1890; Kahneman, 1973) and holds that depression 
either occupies or reduces those available resources (e.g., Beck, 
1967). Furthermore, characteristics of events vary according 
to the amount of resources that they typically demand during 
processing. Hasher and Zacks, for example, proposed that 
both spatiotemporal and overlearned information typically 
are processed automatically, which places little or no demand 
on available resources, but that the use of such learning 
strategies as organization, elaboration, and mnemonic devices 
demands effortful processing. Tasks that involve such strate­
gies, in contrast to more automatic processes, typically pro­
duce superior performance on subsequent tests of remember­
ing (see Craik & Jacoby, 1979). Hence depressed individuals 
show decrements in remembering the materials from effortful 
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processing tasks, as a result of their reduced capacity to 
perform such operations, but do not show decrements in 
remembering materials from tasks that depend on more au­
tomatic processes. They fail to show the memorial benefit of 
effortful processing that is obtained with nondepressed sub­
jects (see Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979). 
A critical issue, then, is whether depression limits the ability 
to use effortful operations or whether, instead, it reduces the 
initiative to use beneficial strategies when their use is not 
demanded by the task. The view just described implies that 
depressed individuals lack the ability to process effortfully 
because resources are allocated to "depressive schemata" or 
because resources are limited in some other fashion (such as 
altered functions of biogenic amines; Baldessarini, 1981; 
Henry, Weingartner, & Murphy, 1973). If depressed subjects 
can allocate resources and perform as well as nondepressed 
subjects on effortful but well-structured tasks, then the utility 
of a focus on cognitive effort should be limited to the stage of 
initiating such effortful processing. 
Our focus on initiative highlights variations in the con­
straints imposed by cognitive tasks. Tasks vary in the degree 
to which they constrain the type and amount of processing, 
in such a way that uninstructed strategies may be elected 
spontaneously in some tasks and reduced or prevented by the 
constraints of other tasks. Nondepressed subjects frequently 
go beyond the requirements of loosely constrained tasks, but 
depressed subjects may fail to initiate similar operations that 
are not required. Whether a depressive impairment in initia­
tive is strictly motivational in nature (see Abramson, Metal­
sky, & Alloy, 1989) or involves metacognitive deficits is a 
topic for further research. Our concern is simply to delineate 
the phenomenon and relate it to previous research on depres­
sion and memory. 
Our emphasis in this report is placed on varying the degree 
of initiative that is induced by retrieval tasks (see Hertel & 
Rude, 1989, for a discussion of initiative during acquisition). 
If depressed persons experience deficits in processing initia­
tive, they should perform poorly in retrieval tasks that are 
sensitive to such initiative. Initiative is encouraged by tasks 
that require judgments of prior occurrence, such as recogni­
tion, because such judgments can occur on a variety of bases 
ranging from feelings of familiarity (a very simple strategy, if 
one at all) to the use of complex reasoning. In contrast, the 
role of initiative is minimized in tasks that provide a useful 
strategy for judgments of prior occurrence. Consequently, 
depressive deficits should be minimized in such tasks. 
Depressive deficits should also decrease in retrieval tasks 
that bypass judgments of prior occurrence by being repre­
sented as something other than a test of memory. The class 
of retrieval tasks that appear to bypass explicit attempts to 
remember is referred to as tests of remembering without 
awareness (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982), nonanalytic mem­
ory (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984), and implicit memory (Graf & 
Schacter, 1985). These tasks index memory for prior exposure 
to materials without subjects' awareness that their memory is 
being tested. They are nonanalytic tests of memory because 
the subjects do not analyze the occurrence of prior exposure 
to the materials on the test. Recently, Perruchet and Baveux 
( 1989) questioned the assumption that nonanalytic tests 
should be lumped together with respect to the type of proc­
essing that they incur. Some of these tests (e.g., word comple­
tion clarification) produce performance that is correlated with 
performance on analytic tests such as recognition or recall. 
Certainly, the proper focus belongs on an examination of the 
processes involved. 
In the following three experiments, we used retrieval tasks 
that reportedly are accomplished with and without awareness 
of remembering. In Experiment 1 we demonstrated a depres­
sive deficit in remembering with awareness during a recogni­
tion task but no deficit on the test of remembering without 
awareness. (We examine issues related to awareness of remem­
bering on that test.) In Experiments 2 and 3, we provided 
strategies for performing each task and expected no depres­
sion-related differences in performance. 
In all three experiments, we used mood-induction proce­
dures on nondepressed college students; the third experiment 
also included a group of naturally depressed students. We are 
not aware of any attempts to compare directly the perform­
ances.of subjects with induced depression and naturally de­
pressed subjects on memory tasks. Such a comparison is 
critical for an understanding of the research on depressive 
deficits because there are reasons to suspect that mood induc­
tions do not produce a state that is similar to naturally 
occurring depression. Students who undergo mood-induction 
procedures describe their feelings differently. Some say that 
they feel lethargic but not really depressed. Lethargy, of 
course, is not clinically comparable with depression, although 
the two states may produce similar effects on cognitive tasks. 
If inductions do produce states comparable with clinical 
depression, subjects with induced depression may nevertheless 
perform quite differently than naturally depressed subjects; 
the latter may have developed methods for adjusting to their 
depression, whereas the former have experienced a very recent 
change in mood state and would have no particular motiva­
tion for such coping strategies. Alternatively, the two states 
may differ in their effects because attention to depressive 
musings characterizes natural depression and not the more 
transient mood. Clearly, a direct comparison of these two 
potentially different mood-related states is required. 
Experiment I 
Apart from our manipulations and measures of mood, the 
procedures of Experiment 1 conformed to those used by 
Jacoby and Witherspoon ( 1982). The spelling of homophones 
(words that sound the same but have different spellings and 
meanings) served as their test of memory without awareness. 
In the first phase of their experiments, subjects were asked a 
series of questions. Homophones contained in some of the 
questions served as targets for the subsequent memory tests, 
and the questions were worded to reflect the homophones' 
less common meaning (i.e., "What color is a pear?"). The 
questions were read aloud by the experimenter, and the 
subjects responded in kind. In Phase 2 the experimenter read 
aloud nonhomophones and homophones, some of which were 
targets and the rest of which were distractors, and asked 
subjects to spell them. Spelling targets (vs. distractors) in the 
less common way indexed memory for the question phase. 
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The spelling test was followed by a recognition test. Both 
normal and amnesic subjects showed the effect of prior ex­
posure by spelling more targets than distractors in the less 
common way, but amnesic subjects experienced the usual 
deficit in recognition. By using similar procedures, we ex­
pected to show a depressive deficit in recognition but not in 
performance on the spelling test. 
In Experiment 1, mood was manipulated through the Vel­
ten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP; Velten, 1968) before 
the question phase and then again before the tests of memory. 
The latter manipulation was our main concern; however, 
evidence for mood dependency in tests of memory with 
awareness (see Blaney, 1986) encouraged us to include the 
former manipulation as well. (If we had not included the first 
manipulation, a depressive deficit in spelling or recognition 
could result from a change in mood between study and test 
in the depressive condition and not in the neutral condition.) 
We did not expect to find overall differences in spelling as 
a function of mood during the question phase. Because tests 
of memory without awareness seem unaffected by variations 
in the degree of analysis during prior exposure (see Jacoby & 
Dallas, 198 1 ), any spontaneous use of strategies during ques­
tioning should not affect performance of the spelling test. In 
contrast, differences in recognition might occur as a function 
of mood during the question phase. Such differences would 
suggest that neutral subjects did something in addition to 




Choosing not to induce further depression in students with that 
tendency, we selected subjects who scored less than 6 on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Er­
baugh, 1961 ). Before the study phase, we induced a depressed or a 
neutral mood by using the VMIP and checked the manipulation with 
the Depression Adjective Check List (DACL; Lubin, 1965). The study 
phase consisted of 24 questions, read aloud. Embedded in 16 of the 
questions were targeted homophones; the questions were worded to 
reflect their less common meaning. Then the second mood induction 
was delivered; half of the previously neutral subjects and half of the 
previously depressed subjects were induced to feel depressed, whereas 
the other halves were placed in a neutral mood. In the subsequent 
spelling test, the experimenter read 32 words aloud (8 targeted hom­
ophones, 8 new homophones, and 16 nonhomophones) and asked 
subjects to give the first spelling that came to mind. Yes/no recogni­
tion followed, and 64 words were read aloud (the 16 targeted homo­
phones, the 8 new homophones on the spelling test, 8 new homo­
phones occurring for the first time, and 32 nonhomophones). The 
experimenter asked the subjects to tell her whether they remembered 
hearing each word in the questions she had asked earlier. A second 
check on the manipulation of mood was then performed. Last, we 
induced elation in those who had been subjected to a previous 
induction of depression. 
Subjects and Design 
Forty-eight subjects recruited from lower division psychology 
courses at Trinity University participated in exchange for course 
credit and met the criterion of scoring less than 6 on the BDl. All 
subjects were tested individually and were randomly assigned to one 
of the following conditions of the VMIP, with the constraint of equal 
ns: neutral study and neutral testing, neutral study and depressed 
testing, depressed study and neutral testing, and depressed study and 
depressed testing. 
Materials 
Homophones and questions. For the study phase, the 32 homo­
phones used by Eich (1984) were equally divided into two lists, A 
and B. The median frequency (KuCera & Francis, 1967) for the 
homophones in each list was I I  (in comparison with 44 and 40 for 
the alternate spellings of the homophones in Lists A and B, respec­
tively). Median ratings of subjective familiarity (Kreuz, 1987) were 
493 and 473 for the homophones in Lists A and B, respectively (in 
comparison with 600 and 556 for their alternate spellings).' 
The homophones from List A or B were presented to subjects in 
the context of questions (e.g., "What color is a pear?"). These 16 
questions were worded to reflect the less common meaning of the 
homophones. Eight additional questions containing no homophones 
were used as fillers in order to disguise the nature of the targeted 
words. The questions for each list were arranged in three orders. The 
first order was random, except that the first and last questions were 
fillers. To obtain the other two orders, blocks of eight questions, as 
well as the questions within each block, were rotated, but the first 
and last questions again were fillers. 
Spelling lists. To construct the spelling lists, the homophones in 
each list of questions were divided into two lists of 8 each. Then 8 
homophones from each list of questions were placed on one spelling 
list, along with 16 nonhomophones; the remaining 8 homophones 
from each list and the same 16 nonhomophones constituted the other 
spelling list. The two spelling lists, then, each contained 8 targeted 
homophones, 8 new homophones as distractors, and 16 nonhomo­
phones. On each spelling list the words were arranged so that each 
block of four words contained one target, one distractor, and two 
nonhomophones; the order within blocks was rotated across blocks. 
Across subjects, each homophone occurred equally often as a target 
and as a distractor. 
The spelling lists were counterbalanced with the question lists, so 
that 3 subjects in each condition of mood induction were assigned to 
each of the four combinations of question and spelling lists. (Each of 
these 3 subjects heard the questions in a different order.) 
Recognition list. A total of 64 words appeared on the recognition 
test: all 16 targets (8 spelled and 8 not spelled), 16 distractors (8 
spelled and 8 not spelled), and 32 nonhomophones (the 16 on the 
spelling tests and 16 new homophones). The words were arranged in 
blocks of 16. Each block contained 4 targets, 4 distractors, 4 spelled 
nonhomophones, and 4 new nonhomophones, arranged randomly; 
the targets and distractors in each block all had been on the spelling 
test or unspelled, depending on which spelling list the subject had 
1 The medians for frequency and familiarity were computed after 
we conducted the experiment. In so doing, we discovered that four 
of the homophones on each list were presented in their more frequent 
or common form, according to the norms that we used. In the 
remainder of this report we assert that the questions biased the less 
common spelling of the homophones, but the reader should keep in 
mind that this assertion was not uniformly valid for Experiments I 
and 2. Nevertheless, no confound was introduced, given that the 
same homophones served as both targets and distractors in spelling 
and recognition. 
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heard. Spelled and unspelled homophones rotated across the four 
blocks. 
Procedure 
The subjects first completed the BDl. Those whose scores were 
greater than 5 were dismissed, and the remaining subjects underwent 
the VMIP. In this procedure for inducing moods, the subjects read 
30 neutral or 30 depressive statements while seated alone in the 
testing room. Neutral statements were factual (e.g., "There are 26 
breeds of cats"), whereas depressive statements were self-referential 
(e.g., "I am feeling sad today"). A tape recorder played beeps at a 
30-s rate. Subjects were instructed to read each statement aloud and 
then silently until the beep occurred to signal the reading of the 
statement on the next page. The instructions encouraged all subjects 
to think only about the statement during its reading and experience 
it as true, but subjects in the depressive condition were also encour­
aged to be receptive to the mood described by the statement. (These 
are standard instructions for the VMIP.) After the mood induction, 
the subjects completed the DACL as a check on the manipulation. 
The DACL contains 32 adjectives that describe emotionally positive 
and negative states, and subjects are instructed to check the ones that 
describe their current feelings. 
The first mood induction and manipulation check was followed 
by the study phase. The experimenter read the list of 24 questions 
aloud, and the subjects answered in kind. Subjects then received the 
second mood induction. Those who had previously read the set of 
neutral statements now read either a second set of 30 neutral state­
ments or a set of 30 depressive statements. But the subjects who had 
previously read depressive statements were treated differently: In 
order to counteract the original depressive induction, subjects passing 
into the neutral condition read 15 neutral statements and 15 elated 
statements; in order to maintain rather than increase a depressive 
state, subjects passing into a second depressive induction read 15 
neutral and 15 depressive statements. In these sets of combined 
statements, the nature of the statement alternated. 
The spelling test was administered immediately after the second 
induction. The experimenter said, "I am going to read some words 
to you and I want you to spell them for me. I want you to give me 
the first spelling that comes to mind." She paced the reading at a 
rapid rate and, if subjects paused, reminded them to spell quickly. 
Subjects spelled aloud, and the experimenter recorded the nature of 
the spellings (in line with the question's context or the alternate 
meaning). 
Instructions for the subsequent recognition test were as follows: 
I am going to read some words to you and I want you to tell me 
if you remember hearing those words in the questions I asked 
you earlier-not in the statements that you read or in the spelling 
test, only in the questions I asked you earlier. Please respond yes 
or no. I also want you to rate your confidence in your decision 
on a scale of I to 5, with 5 being the most confident. 
The list of 64 words was then read, and the subjects responded orally. 
After the recognition task, subjects completed a second DACL as 
a check for the second manipulation of mood. Before their debriefing, 
the subjects who had been induced to feel depressed read 30 elated 
statements from the VMIP. These subjects were also interviewed 
carefully in order to ensure that they left the experiment in a nonde­
pressed state. During debriefing for all subjects, the experimenter 
asked questions that were designed to reveal their subjective experi­
ences during spelling. Specifically, she attempted to discover whether 
any subjects viewed the spelling test as a test of memory for words in 
the previous questions. 
Results and Discussion 
Interesting consequences of the mood induction before 
testing were obtained, and they offer support for the proposal 
that the depressed students experienced deficits in processing 
initiative during the retrieval tasks. Howev�r, the results failed 
to show evidence of mood dependency (see Blaney, 1986, for 
a review that emphasized the many failures to find mood­
dependent memory), although the manipulation of mood was 
confirmed by scores on the DACL (see the following section). 
The results also failed to show effects of the mood induction 
before the question phase on the subsequent spelling and 
recognition tests. The question task seemed to have encour­
aged similar degrees and types of processing by neutral and 
depressed subjects. 
In the reports of analyses performed on spelling and rec­
ognition, we ignore the factor for the first mood induction, 
although the factor was included in those analyses, along with 
a between-subjects factor for mood at testing and a within­
subjects factor appropriate to the measure of memory (i.e., 
prior exposure-target vs. distractor-for analyses of spelling 
performance, and the spelling status of the homophone for 
analyses of recognition). For all analyses, the significance level 
was set at .05. 
Mood Indices 
Scores on the BDI did not differ reliably according to 
conditions of mood during study or testing (means ranged 
from 1.92 to 2.83). Scores on the first administration of the 
DACL were analyzed with mood during study as a factor. 
The mean score was 8.08 for subjects in the neutral condition 
and 15.25 for those in the depressed condition; the difference 
was reliable, F( 1, 46) = 30.61, MS.= 20. 138. Scores on the 
second administration were analyzed with factors for mood 
during study and mood during testing. Only the main effect 
of mood during testing was reliable (7.42 for neutral condition 
vs. 12.08 for depressed condition), F(1, 44) = 16.82, MS. = 
15.534. 
Spelling 
The effect of prior exposure to homophones on the spelling 
test (proportion of targets spelled in the less common way, in 
comparison with the proportion of distractors) served as a 
measure of memory without awareness. The spelling test 
indexed similar performance by neutral and depressed sub­
jects. The mean proportion of targets spelled in line with the 
questions (the less common way) in each condition was .4 1, 
which was significantly larger than the mean proportion of 
distractors that were spelled in the less common way (.34 for 
neutral mood and .26 for depressed mood), F(l, 44) = 9.54, 
MS. = 0.029. (The difference for distractors alone was not 
reliable at . 1  0, nor was the interaction of prior exposure with 
mood during testing.) In interviews at the end of the experi­
ment, all subjects reported a lack of awareness of the spelling 
test as a measure of memory for words in the list of questions. 
According to these self-reports, if they did notice a relation 
between the questions and the spelling words, they neverthe-
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less gave the first spelling that came to mind. They did not 
attempt to spell in line with the questions, probably because 
the experimenter stressed immediate responding in the spell­
ing task. 
Recognition 
In recognition, strategies can be elected. One strategy would 
be to consult the status of the word on the previous spelling 
test-to use spelling as a means of gaining access to the 
question. Depressed subjects' performance was not correlated 
with how the word had been spelled or with whether it had 
been spelled (see Table 1, top half). Recognition was inde­
pendent of spelling. In contrast, neutral subjects were more 
likely to report recognition if they had spelled the word in 
line with the questions (biased) than if they had used the more 
common spelling (unbiased) or had not spelled it. 
These conclusions are based on an examination of the 
proportion of affirmative responses conditionalized on the 
spelling status of the targets (spelled in line with the questions, 
spelled in the unbiased way, or not spelled).2 The interaction 
of mood during testing (neutral or depressed) with spelling 
status was reliable, F(2, 88) = 4.04, MS. = 0.056. When 
neutral subjects had spelled targets in line with the questions, 
they benefited on the later test of recognition. The mean 
proportion of hits was . 70 for neutral subjects, in comparison 
with .52 for depressed subjects, F(I, 44) = 4.74, MS.= 0.078. 
Both gamma and phi coefficients were also computed to 
represent the association between spelling and recognition 
performance by each subject. The analysis of gamma showed 
a marginally reliable effect of mood at testing (Ms = .33 for 
neutral mood and -.03 for depressed mood), F(1, 44) = 3.26, 
MS. = 0.468, p < .08. The effect was reliable for phi (.22 vs. 
-.04), F(l, 44) = 6.42, MS.= 0. 122. 
Neutral subjects showed evidence of correlated perform­
ance on spelling and recognition, perhaps because they no­
ticed the connection between the spelling words and the 
questions during the spelling task. In other words, perhaps 
spelling did not constitute a test of remembering without 
awareness. However, if they did notice such a relation during 
the spelling task, they did not make use of that knowledge in 
spelling the homophones; their spelling performance was 
comparable with the performance by subjects with induced 
depression. Nevertheless, noticing the relation could consti­
tute a practice trial in recognition memory. In line with this 
possibility is the finding that homophones spelled in the more 
Table 1 
Mean Proportion of Hits Conditionalized on Spelling Status: 
Experiments 1 and 2 
Spelling status 
Testing mood n Biased Unbiased Unspelled 
Experiment I 
Neutral 24 .70 .48 .59 
Depressed 24 .52 .58 .56 
Experiment 2 
Neutral 12 .84 .40 .65 
Depressed 12 .80 .36 .56 
common way by neutral subjects were less likely to be recog­
nized than were unspelled homophones. In Experiment 2 we 
told subjects to consider words from the questions while 
spelling, so that we could determine whether depressed sub­
jects can profit from such a strategy. 
Another account of the neutral subjects' superior recogni­
tion of targets that were spelled in line with the questions is 
that they used a strategy for consulting their previous spelling 
performance when making recognition judgments. As we 
suggested earlier, one way to recognize homophones-if one 
has noticed that some of the words on the recognition task 
had been spelled-is to recall how the homophone was 
spelled. Recalling accurately could provide the best route for 
retrieving the question context and thereby recognizing the 
homophone from the study phase. In Experiment 3 we in­
structed some subjects to check back to their spelling perform­
ance as a step in arriving at the recognition decision, and we 
predicted that the depressed subjects would perform as well 
as the neutral subjects when they were so instructed. 
Experiment 1, however, provided some evidence that neu­
tral subjects spontaneously consulted their spelling perform­
ance on the recognition test more frequently than did the 
depressed subjects. The neutral subjects made more frequent 
false alarms in response to homophonic distractors that had 
been spelled (mean proportion = . 19) than to those that had 
not been on the spelling test (.08). Depressed subjects did not 
show such a difference in false alarms (.09 for spelled vs . .  1 1  
for unspelled). The interaction of mood during testing with 
the spelling status of the distractors was reliable, F( 1, 44) = 
6.30, MS.= 0.019. 
Experiment 2 
One purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether 
performance by neutral subjects and subjects with induced 
depression alike can benefit from a strategy for spelling hom­
ophones. All subjects were instructed to notice the relation 
between words on the spelling test and words in the questions. 
Again, we expected depressed subjects to perform without a 
deficit and spell at levels comparable with those by nonde­
pressed subjects. It seemed that both types of subjects would 
notice relations on the basis of familiarity because they had 
little time for more analytic attempts to recognize homo­
phones on the basis of retrieving questions. 
Our more central aim, however, was to see whether provid­
ing depressed subjects with a strategy for spelling would help 
them on the subsequent test of recognition. In effect, the 
spelling test can serve as a second processing trial for homo­
phones in the questions, particularly if the relation between 
the two tasks is observed. Knowing about the relation between 
the spelling and questioning phases should provide useful 
information for making recognition decisions. 
Another change from the procedures of Experiment 1 con­
cerned inductions of depressed moods. Because we failed to 
find evidence for effects of mood during study in Experiment 
2 Analyses of confidence ratings revealed effects that were very 
similar to the ones that we report here. 
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1, inductions were delivered in this experiment at the end of 
the question phase only. We wished to submit a conservative 
number of subjects to an induction of a depressive mood. 
Method 
Twenty-four students from lower division psychology courses at 
Trinity University volunteered in exchange for credit and met the 
criterion for mood inductions (BDI score < 6). With the constraint 
of equal ns, they were randomly assigned to receive either a neutral 
or a depressive induction, and within those conditions they were 
assigned in equal numbers to the question and spelling lists. The 
materials and procedures from Experiment 1 were used, with three 
exceptions: (a) The first mood induction and the first DACL were 
omitted, (b) confidence ratings were excluded from the procedure for 
recognition, and (c) instructions for the spelling test were changed to 
"I am going to read some words to you and I want you to spell them 
for me. You may find that thinking back to the questions will help 
you to spell the words." 
Results and Discussion 
Mood Indices 
Scores on the DACL were higher for the subjects with 
induced depression than for the neutral subjects ( 13.33 vs. 
9.58), although the difference was only marginally reliable, 
F( 1, 22) = 3.16, MSe = 26.708, p < .1 0. The mean scores on 
the BDI were roughly comparable ( 1.67 for depressed subjects 
and 2.25 for neutral subjects; p > .40). 
Spelling 
Again, no reliable differences according to mood induction 
were obtained in spelling performance. Only the effect of 
prior exposure was reliable, F( 1, 22) = 24.77, MSe = 0.034. 
Depressed subjects spelled 54% of targets and 29% of distrac­
tors in the less common way, whereas the comparable per­
centages for neutral subjects were 56 and 28, respectively. But 
levels of remembering were higher than in Experiment 1 (a 
.27 difference between targets and distractors in Experiment 
2, in comparison with .11 in Experiment 1 ). Providing a 
strategy for spelling made the spelling test a test of memory 
with awareness and appeared to elevate the performance of 
neutral and depressed subjects. 
Recognition 
In the last two rows of Table 1 we present the results of 
recognition conditionalized on the spelling status of the tar­
gets. The proportion of affirmative responses in both condi­
tions of mood depended on spelling performance, as indicated 
by a reliable main effect of the spelling status, F(2, 44) = 
28.39, MSe = 0.041. Effects involving mood were not reliable. 
Neutral subjects recognized 84% of the homophones that they 
had spelled in line with the question, 40% of those that they 
spelled in the unbiased way, and 65% of those that they had 
not spelled; the corresponding percentages for depressed sub­
jects were 80, 36, and 56. Averaged gamma coefficients were 
.66 for neutral subjects and .78 for depressed subjects (the 
difference was not reliable). Averaged phi coefficients were 
.40 for neutral subjects and .45 for depressed subjects. 
Last, the false alarm rates, which were highest for homo­
phones spelled by neutral subjects in Experiment 1, did not 
differ according to mood in Experiment 2. False alarms in 
response to the homophones from the spelling test, however, 
tended to be more frequent than false alarms for new distrac­
tors (12% vs. 7%), although the difference was not reliable. 
In summary, the mood-induced deficits of Experiment 1 
disappeared in Experiment 2 when all subjects were instructed 
to notice relations that neutral subjects might have detected 
on their own analysis and through their own initiative. Both 
groups were more likely to recognize the targets that they had 
spelled in line with the questions than the other targets. 
Experiment 3 
In this experiment we directed some subjects to use a 
strategy during recognition, whereas other subjects followed 
our previous instructions. We expected to show depressive 
deficits in the undirected condition only. Subjects in the 
directed condition followed a series of steps in making their 
recognition judgments. They were directed (a) to judge 
whether the word had been on the spelling test, (b) to report 
how they had spelled it or how they would have spelled it if 
it had been on the spelling test, (c) to decide whether the word 
had been part of a question, and (d) to identify the question. 
We reasoned that if subjects used these procedures for recog­
nition, they would most likely recognize words that they 
spelled in the biased way on the spelling test or on the directed 
test of recognition, or on both, and least likely recognize 
words that they spelled in the unbiased way. If the spelling 
test provided a rehearsal trial, as it seemed to do according to 
the results of the first two experiments, this strategy for 
recognition should affect performance regardless of mood, 
but particularly for depressed subjects. Some subjects in the 
neutral condition, we hypothesized, might use such a strategy 
on their own initiative. 
Under each condition of the recognition task, we added a 
group of subjects who reported moderate to severe depression 
on the BDI, so that we could directly compare the conditions 
for obtaining deficits under naturally occurring depression to 
those for obtaining deficits from mood inductions. Mood­
induction procedures produce transient mood states, and the 
effects of transient moods are interesting in their own right. 
However, their effects on memory should be compared with 
the memorial concomitants of natural depression, so that the 
diverse findings from mood-related memory investigations 
can be understood. 
The focus of most research involving mood-induction pro­
cedures has been on mood congruency-the compatibility 
between the nature of the mood and the nature of the mate­
rials to be recalled (see reviews by Blaney, 1986; Johnson & 
Magaro, 1987). Overall deficits (regardless of congruency) are 
sometimes found and sometimes not, but the emotional 
nature of the materials presents a complex puzzle. In Experi­
ments 1 and 2, some meanings of some homophones were 
emotional in nature. When we performed analyses of data 
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that excluded these emotional homophones, we obtained the 
same pattern of results that we report here, probably because 
the questions that provided their context were not emotional. 
However, on the grounds of simplicity, we selected emotion­
ally neutral words for Experiment 3.3 We also designed the 
materials in ways that would allow us to examine the r�cog­
nition of nonhomophones. 
Method 
Materials 
Homophones were chosen from a list compiled by Kreuz ( 1987) 
and submitted to an independent group of 20 subjects for ratings of 
emotionality. Subjects rated both meanings of the homophones, as 
well as nonhomophones, on a scale of 1 (not at all emotional) to 7 
(extremely emotional). On the basis of minimizing the median ratings 
of emotionality, 24 homophones were selected for use in the experi­
ment. They were divided into four lists of 6 homophones each. We 
made assignments to lists by attempting to equate the lists on the 
following eight indices: median emotional values for both the less 
common and the more common spelling; median frequencies (see 
Kueera & Francis, 1967) for both spellings, plus the difference in 
frequency between the two; and median familiarities (see Kreuz, 
1 987) of both spellings, plus the difference in familiarity between the 
two. The range of median emotional values across lists and spellings 
was 1 . 1 8- 1 .  7 1 .  Median differences ranged from 52 to 62 for frequen­
cies and from 83 to 109 for familiarity ratings. 
Twenty-four nonhomophones were chosen on the basis of emo­
tional ratings and number of letters that were similar to those of 
the 24 homophones. Their median frequency of 30 fell between 
the frequencies for the less common spelling of the homophones 
(Mdn = 10) and the more common spelling (Mdn = 49). We also 
divided the nonhomophones into four lists of 6 each by attempting 
to equate the lists on median emotional ratings (which ranged from 
1 .48 to 1 .88) and median frequencies (26 to 34). 
Two lists of homophones and two lists of nonhomophones were 
combined to comprise the words for each list of questions (Question 
Lists A and B). Then, one list of 6 homophones and one list of 6 
nonhomophones from each question list were combined to form 
Spelling List I; the other 12 words from each question list formed 
Spelling List 2. Last, all 48 words appeared on the recognition list, 
together with 12 fillers that were chosen for their analogous frequen­
cies, emotional ratings, and numbers of letters. 
Nonhomophones appeared in the first two and last two questions 
on each question list; other words were randomly assigned to Ques­
tions 3-22, but no more than two homophones were allowed to occur 
consecutively. As in previous experiments, the questions were worded 
to reflect their less common meaning. Each block of eight words on 
the spelling lists contained two homophones and two nonhomo­
phones from Question List A and two of each type from Question 
List B; within blocks the words were randomly arranged with the 
constraint that two words of the same type and question Jist could 
not appear consecutively. Last, each block of 10 words on the 
recognition list contained two fillers and one word from each com­
bination of question list, type of word (homophone vs. nonhomo­
phone), and spelling list. Within blocks the words were randomly 
ordered with the constraint of no consecutive occurrences of words 
from the same question list and spelling list and with a limit of two 
consecutive occurrences of homophones. 
Subjects and Design 
A total of 9 1  students at Trinity University participated in exchange 
for credit in their lower division psychology courses. They were 
selected for participation by the following method: BDis were distrib­
uted to lower division psychology classes, in which students were 
asked to fill them out anonymously and return them in sealed 
envelopes, along with a signed consent form. Paula Hertel scored the 
BDis, recorded the scores for later use, and constructed lists of 
nondepressed and depressed students (BDI scores < 6 and > 9, 
respectively). Experimenters scheduled these students for participa­
tion in the experiment. 
Under constraints of equal ns, initially nondepressed subjects were 
randomly assigned to receive a combination of mood induction 
(neutral vs. depressed), recognition task (directed vs. undirected), 
question list (List A or List B), and spelling list (List 1 or List 2). 
Initially depressed subjects all received the neutral-mood induction 
and were randomly assigned to receive combinations of the other 
factors. 
The BDI was administered again during the experimental session. 
An average of 1 3  days intervened between the first and second 
administrations of the BDI ( 14 days for depressed subjects alone). 
These procedures conformed to those suggested by Deardorff and 
Funabiki ( 1 985) to ensure stability in depressed groups. They also 
served as a safeguard for the nondepressed subjects who would 
undergo induction procedures. Initially nondepressed subjects filled 
out the second BDI at the beginning of the experimental session, and 
those who scored higher than 5 were dismissed. Initially depressed 
subjects filled out the second BDI at the end of the experimental 
session, along with a form that was designed to rule out those with 
depressionlike symptoms due to illness, drug use, or sudden catastro­
phe (ROC form). The form was developed by S. Rude to reflect 
research diagnostic criteria (ROC) for minor or major depression (see 
Spitzer et al., 1978). Depressed subjects placed the forms in an 
envelope marked with their subject number and delivered them to 
the psychology department office. They were led to believe that these 
forms were part of a separate study. We used such deception because 
we suspected that depressed students might minimize their depression 
in the presence of a peer who was the experimenter. Again, only 
Hertel had access to these forms. 
The data from 12 initially depressed students were eliminated from 
analyses and subsequently replaced because they did not meet our 
final criteria for natural depression (BDI score > 9 on both adminis­
trations and ROC). Of these 12 subjects, 3 failed to tum in their 
second BDI and interview form at the end of the session, 5 scored 
less than 9 on the second BDI, and 4 did not meet ROC. 
Stringency for selecting naturally depressed subjects suggested that 
we use some criterion beyond the BDI for including neutral subjects 
and subjects with induced depression. The DACL is usually used as 
a ·check on the mood manipulation, but in this experiment we used 
it to ensure that our neutral subjects were not feeling bad and that 
our subjects with induced depression were not in a good mood. As a 
result, the data from 7 initially nondepressed subjects were eliminated 
on the basis of their DACL scores and were subsequently replaced. 
Three of these subjects participated in the neutral-induction condition 
but scored higher than 12 on the DACL (they checked no positive 
3 � proper investigation of mood congruency with homophones 
requires that only one meaning be emotional or that the two meanings 
have different emotional valences and, furthermore, that the less 
common meaning correspond to emotionality in some controllable 
way. �orms for homophones and emotionality are not sufficiently 
extensive for such control, if indeed it is possible. 
52 PAULA T. HERTEL AND TAMMY S. HARDIN 
adjectives and at least two negative adjectives). The 4 remaining 
subjects participated in the depression-induction condition but scored 
lower than 6 on the DACL (they checked no negative adjectives and 
at least five positive adjectives). In subsequent phone interviews by 
Hertel, these 4 subjects aJso said that they were not at aU depressed 
by the induction procedure.4 
In sum, analyses were performed on the data from 72 subjects, 12 
in each of the six combinations of mood and recognition task. The 
procedure for counterbalancing question list and spelling list within 
each of the six conditions ensured that each word appeared an equal 
number of times across subjects as a spelled target, an unspelled 
target, a spelled distractor, and an unspelled distractor.5 
Procedure 
We used the procedures from Experiment 2 before the spelling 
test, which was administered according to the instructions in Experi­
ment 1. After the spelling test, the experimenter consulted the instruc­
tions that assigned subjects to either the undirected or the directed 
recognition task and administered the appropriate test. Procedures 
for undirected recognition mimicked those used in Experiment 2. 
Instructions for the directed task were as follows: 
The next task is a recognition task. I will read another list of 
words. Your task will be to decide if each word occurred in the 
questions that I asked you in the first task. In order to help you 
remember, I will ask you a series of questions. The first question 
I will ask is "Was the word on the spelling test?" Please answer 
by saying "yes" or "no." If you answer "yes," I will ask you to 
remember how you spelled it. If you answer "no," I will ask you 
how you would have spelled it. Third, I will ask you if the word 
was in the set of questions in the first task and ask you to try to 
recall a question with that word in it. If you can, you will know 
that the word was in the question phase. Even if you cannot 
recall a question, please try to decide if the word occurred in the 
question phase. 
The recognition task was administered in accordance with those 
instructions. For example, if the word was chin, subjects were asked, 
"Was the word chin on the spelling test? How did you spell it [or 
How would you have spelled it]? Was the word chin on the question 
list? What question contained that word?" Subjects responded orally, 
and the experimenter recorded all four responses for each word. 
After the recognition test, subjects filled out the DACL and were 
debriefed. Subjects with induced depression received an elation in­
duction. Naturally depressed subjects were asked to fill out the BDI 
and ROC forms and deliver them to the office. 
Results and Discussion 
Mood Indices 
Scores on the second administration of the BDI averaged 
2.40 for initially nondepressed subjects (an upper limit was 
set at 5) and did not reliably differ according to assignment 
to recognition task or mood induction. The mean for de­
pressed subjects was 15.29, with no reliable difference between 
recognition conditions. 6 
Scores on the DACL reflected assignments to mood con­
ditions alone, F(2, 6(i) = 9.62, MS. = 30.780. After we 
replaced neutral subjects and subjects with induced depression 
according to criteria for the DACL, their mean scores were 
6.36 and 12.42, respectively, with no reliable effects of assign-
ment to conditions of recognition. Naturally depressed sub­
jects also averaged 12.42 on the DACL. 
Spelling 
The results of the first spelling test replicated those from 
Experiment 1. When the proportions of homophones spelled 
in the less common way were submitted to an analysis of 
variance, with factors for task (undirected vs. directed), mood 
(neutral, induced-depressed, and naturally depressed), and 
prior exposure (targets vs. distractors), only the main effect of 
prior exposure was reliable, F(l, 66) = 17.74, MSe = 0.033. 
Targets were spelled in line with the questions 50% of the 
time by neutral subjects, 48% by subjects with induced depres­
sion, and 51 % by naturally depressed subjects. The corre­
sponding percentages for distractors were 40, 32, and 40. 
Across all conditions of mood and task, 50% of targets and 
37% of distractors were spelled in line with the questions; this 
difference of 13% is similar to the difference of 11 % in 
Experiment l ,  although the overall percentages were higher. 
This difference was also apparently less than the difference of 
27% that was obtained under more analytic conditions for 
spelling in Experiment 2, and it therefore suggests that subjects 
in Experiment 3 were not attempting to spell in line with the 
questions. 
Recognition 
In this experiment both homophones and nonhomophones 
were rotated through all conditions, appearing as targets that 
were on the spelling test, targets that were not, distractors that 
were on the spelling test, and distractors that were encountered 
for the first time on the recognition test. Our first analyses, 
then, were performed on all words. They included factors for 
task, mood, spelling status (on the spelling test or not), and 
type of word (homophone vs. nonhomophone). The depend­
ent variable for this analysis was d'. 
Directing subjects to use a strategy for recognition improved 
their accuracy overall, as indicated by a main effect of task, 
F(l, 66) = 7.27, MSe = 2.140. The mean d's were 1.75 for 
undirected subjects and 2.21 for directed subjects. This effect, 
however, was attenuated by two interactions: Task x Type of 
Word, F(l, 66) = 4.62, MSe = 0.552, and Task X Spelling 
4 At the request of Trinity University's Internal Review Board, 
Paula Hertel phoned all subjects who underwent an induction of 
depression in order to determine whether the depressed mood had 
dissipated by the end of the session. (Only l of 28 said it did not, but 
she reported other reasons for feeling tired.) Hertel also asked these 
subjects to describe their mood during the experiment and classified 
their responses into one of the following categories: nondepressed 
(21 %), questionable (18%), lethargic (18%), and depressed (43%). 
5 One assignment error was made. In the directed condition of 
recognition, 4 depressed subjects received Question List B and Spell­
ing List 1, whereas 2 depressed subjects received Question List B and 
Spelling List 2. 
6 Verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test scores were not reliably correlated 
with scores on either administration of the BDI, with experimental 
conditions, or with measures of spelling and recognition performance. 
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Status, F( l ,  66) = 5.49, MS. = 0.640. Mean d's for homo­
phones were 1 .53 for undirected subjects and 2. 18  for directed 
subjects; the corresponding means for nonhomophones were 
1 .97 and 2.24. Mean d's for spelled words were 1 .47 (undi­
rected) and 2. 1 5  (directed); for unspelled words, they were 
2.03 (undirected) and 2.27 (directed}. As these means show, 
we also obtained reliable main effects of the type of word, 
F( l ,  66) = 8. 10, MS. = 0.552, and spelling status, F( l ,  66) = 
1 3.04, MS. = 0.640. Viewed as a whole, these results show 
that subjects under all mood conditions experienced more 
difficulties in undirected recognition, especially for homo­
phones and for words from the spelling test. 
None of the overall effects involving mood was reliable, but 
there was a trend for naturally depressed subjects to benefit 
most from the directions. The average differences in d' be­
tween directed and undirected recognition were .33 (neutral 
subjects), .44 (subjects with induced depression), and .62 
(naturally depressed subjects). 
Conditionalized Recognition of Homophonic Targets 
In order to examine the more specific effects of directing 
the use of a strategy on the recognition of homophonic targets 
(as in Experiments 1 and 2), the proportions of homophones 
from the question phase that subjects correctly recognized 
were submitted to an analysis of variance, with factors for 
task (undirected vs. directed), mood (neutral, induced depres­
sion, and natural depression), and the status of the homo­
phone on the spelling test (spelled in line with the question, 
spelled in the more common way, not on the spelling test). 
Means are presented in Table 2. Recognition reliably de­
pended on the status of the homophone on the spelling test, 
F(2, 1 26) = 8.77, MS.= 0.070. But this effect was attenuated 
by the marginally reliable three-way interaction, F(4, 126) = 
1 .99, MS. = 0.070, p < . 1 0. 
We evaluated this interaction by examining differences 
according to spelling status within each combination of mood 
and task. Reliable differences obtained for neutral subjects in 
the undirected task, F(2, 62) = 3. 16, MS. = 0.076; as we 
found in Experiment 1 ,  neutral subjects recognized targets 
most often if they had spelled them in line with the questions. 
However, to our surprise, recognition did not depend on 
spelling status for neutral subjects in the directed condition. 
The means show that our directions for recognition elevated 
neutral subjects' recognition of homophones that they had 
spelled in the more common way. (The results of analyses of 
directed recognition are relevant to this finding and are de­
scribed in the next section.) 
Neither depressed group showed differences according to 
spelling status in the undirected condition. In both conditions 
recognition was independent of spelling. Although there was 
a trend according to spelling status for the subjects with 
induced depression in the directed task, the directions did not 
elevate their recognition of homophones spelled in line with 
the questions (.53 of the homophones spelled in line with the 
questions were recognized by the "induced" subjects in the 
directed condition vs . .  55 in the undirected condition). In 
contrast, the performance of the naturally depressed subjects 
in the directed task reliably depended on the spelling status 
Table 2 
Mean Proportion of Hits Conditionalized on Spelling Status: 
Experiment 3 
Spelling status 
Recognition task n Biased Unbiased Unspelled 
Undirected 
Neutral 12 .66 .39- .46 
Induced depressed 1 1  .55 .40 .44 
Naturally depressed l l  .50 .38 .46 
Directed 
Neutral l l  .57 .60 .58 
Induced depressed 1 2  .53 .32 .54 
Naturally depressed 1 2  .68 .26 .54 
of the homophones, F(2, 64) = 8.43, MS.= 0.064; naturally 
depressed subjects recognized more homophones that they 
had spelled in line with the questions, fewer that they had 
spelled in the more common way, a:nd more that they had 
not spelled. Their performance was similar to that of neutral 
subjects who were undirected in this experiment and in Ex­
periment l .  7 
Performance on Directed Recognition 
The results thus far suggest that our strategy for recognition 
produced the expected effects for naturally depressed subjects 
only. Their overall accuracy in recognition was most im­
proved by our directions, and they were most likely to cor­
rectly identify homophonic targets that they had spelled in 
line with the questions. Subjects with induced depression also 
showed improved accuracy, but requiring them to recall how 
they had spelled homophones did not increase their recogni­
tion of homophonic targets. Last, neutral subjects' recognition 
accuracy was improved by directions, and their pattern of 
recognizing homophonic targets was changed by those direc­
tions. In particular, their identifications of homophones 
spelled in the more common or unbiased way increased. As 
a means of understanding the effects of our instructions to 
subjects in the directed condition, we conducted analyses of 
their responses to the questions used in that task. In the 
following sections, we organize descriptions of those analyses 
7 An analysis of phi coefficients confirmed the trends in analyses 
of conditionalized recognition by revealing a reliable interaction of 
mood with task, F(2, 60) = 3.90, MS. = . 1 46. The means in the 
undirected condition and the directed condition were .32 and -.04 
(for neutral subjects), . 1 8  and . 1 8  (for subjects with induced depres­
sion), and . 1 5  and .46 (for naturally depressed subjects). Recognition 
depended on how the word had been spelled only when neutral 
subjects were not directed to use our strategy (.32) and when naturally 
depressed subjects were so directed (.46). 
The interaction of task and mood in analyses of gammas was only 
marginally reliable, F(2, 60) = 2.92, MS. = .597, p < .07. Means in 
the undirected and directed conditions were .59 and .00 (for neutral 
subjects), .36 and .2 1 (for subjects with induced depression), and . 19 
and .73 (for naturally depressed subjects). Again, reliable associations 
of spelling and recognition were found for undirected neutral-mood 
subjects and directed naturally depressed subjects. 
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with specific questions: (a) Did subjects remember which 
homophones they had spelled? (b) Did they remember which 
way they had spelled? (c) Did recognition depend on how 
homophones were spelled in the recognition procedure? 
Did subjects remember which homophones they had 
spelled? If subjects were confused about which homophones 
they had spelled earlier, their ability to use the spelling test as 
a route to recognition would be impaired. In order to deter­
mine whether such confusions differed according to mood, 
the proportions of correct responses to the first question in 
the series ("Was the word on the spelling test?") were submit­
ted to an analysis of variance. The analysis was restricted to 
homophones from the spelling test. Factors included mood, 
spelling status (spelled in the less common vs. more common 
way on the spelling test), and prior exposure in the questions 
(target vs. distractor). No reliable differences were obtained; 
the overall mean percentage of hits was 86. (In a separate 
analysis, false alarm rates for homophones not on the spelling 
test did not differ reliably as a function of mood or prior 
exposure; the mean percentage of false alarms was 07.) Thus 
differences in directed recognition should not be attributed to 
differences in memory for having spelled the words. 
Did they remember which way they had spelled? The 
second question in the series was "How did you spell the 
word?" If subjects could not accurately remember how they 
had spelled homophones, they might not be able to profit 
from our strategy for recognition. So, in order to reveal 
possible differences according to mood, we performed an 
analysis of variance on the proportion of homophones from 
the spelling task that were spelled again in the same way. 
Factors included mood and prior exposure in the questions. 
Although the interaction of mood and prior exposure was not 
reliable, the means in the top section of Table 3 show a trend 
for neutral subjects alone to forget how they had spelled 
homophones from the question phase (Ms = . 8 1  for targets 
vs . . 92 for distractors). 
Did recognition depend on how homophones were spelled 
during the recognition procedure? In previous analyses we 
examined recognition conditionalized on how homophones 
were spelled on the spelling test. But the data from directed 
recognition made it possible to examine recognition condi­
tionalized on how homophones were spelled during recogni­
tion as well. In the second section of Table 3 we show the 
mean proportions of homophonic targets that were recog­
nized; these proportions are contingent on how subjects 
spelled them on one versus two occasions. Only consistent 
spellings across the two occasions were included in these 
analyses. (The mean number of recognized targets that had 
been spelled in both ways was only .33 across all mood 
groups.) 
The analysis of variance included factors for mood, way of 
spelling (less vs. more common), and the number of spelling 
attempts (two when the homophone had been on the spelling 
test vs. one if it was spelled only during recognition). Homo­
phones spelled in the biased way (M = .66) were better 
recognized regardless of the number of spelling attempts 
(M == .36 for unbiased spellings), F( l ,  3 1 ) = 47.23, MS. = 
0.068. However, spelling in the biased way did not help 
subjects with induced depression as much as it did the other 
Table 3 
Performance on Directed Recognition: Experiment 3 
Mood 
Item Neutral Induced Depressed 
Spelling accuracy 
n 12 12 12 
Targets .81 .97 .90 
Distractors .92 .92 .89 
n 
Proportion correct recognition 














Twice .57 .30 .20 
Once .26 .48 .31 
Average .42 .39 .26 
Note. Spelling accuracy refers to the proportion of times that a target 
homophone was spelled the same way on the directed recognition 
test as it was on the spelling test. Proportion co"ect recognition refers 
to the proportion of times that a homophone was correctly recognized 
from the questioning phase, contingent on how it had been spelled 
(biased or unbiased) on both occasions (twice) or on the recognition 
test only (once). 
two groups; the interaction of spelling with mood was reliable, 
F(2, 3 1 )  = 3.38, MS. = 0.068. 
Last, the three-way interaction was marginally reliable, F(2, 
3 1 )  = 2.58, MS. = 0.058, p < . 10. Recognition was not 
reliably improved by two consistent spellings in the biased or 
less common way, in comparison with only one (homophones 
not on the spelling test), regardless of mood. Yet two consist­
ent spellings in the unbiased way did affect recognition differ­
ently across conditions of mood, as indicated by a reliable 
interaction of mood with the number of unbiased spellings, 
F(2, 32) = 4.90, MS. == 0.085. Spelling twice in the unbiased 
way was associated with low recognition in the two depressed 
groups but with higher recognition by neutral subjects. 
Summary. Examinations of performance on the separate 
steps of the recognition procedure revealed important clues 
for understanding how subjects used our strategy for recog­
nition. First, naturally depressed subjects clearly profited from 
our directions. They quite accurately recalled how they had 
spelled homophones on the spelling test and subsequently 
used that information in recognition. In contrast, subjects 
with induced depression received less benefit from spelling 
targets in line with the questions. The benefit was larger when 
they had spelled targets twice (.57 for biased spellings vs . .30 
for unbiased spellings) than when they had spelled them only 
once (.55 vs . .48), but even then the association with spelling 
performance was not much greater than for subjects with 
induced depression in the undirected test of recognition (.55  
vs . .40). 
Last, the neutral subjects outfoxed us in the directed rec­
ognition task. This task increased the accuracy of recognizing 
homophones, but not in the manner that we expected. Instead 
of an increase in recognition of targets spelled in line with the 
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questions, they showed an increase in recognition of homo­
phones spelled in the unbiased way on the spelling test. We 
suggest that this tendency can be attributed to a recognition 
strategy that we had not anticipated. Perhaps the request to 
recall previous spellings alerted them to think of the alterna­
tive meaning and to use it as a route for retrieval. This 
possibility is consistent with their tendency not to remember 
how they had spelled. 
In short, the directed task made recognition more complex 
for neutral subjects than for depressed subjects, perhaps be­
cause neutral subjects were more likely to use both meanings 
of homophones as routes for retrieving questions. Depressed 
subjects showed no evidence of having consulted both mean­
ings of the homophones on the recognition test. We suspect 
that we would have to tell them to do so. 
General Discussion 
Our account of depressive deficits in processing initiative 
first anticipates depressive deficits in remembering when the 
task encourages spontaneous uses of strategies. In this regard, 
evidence for deficits in undirected tasks of recognition was 
produced in Experiments 1 and 3: Depressed subjects recog­
nized fewer homophones that they had spelled in line with 
the questions than did neutral subjects. Furthermore, recog­
nition was independent of spelling for depressed subjects only. 
Second, deficits are not expected in tasks in which strategies 
are inappropriate and in tasks in which they are clearly 
specified by the instructions. Strategies for remembering were 
bypassed in the spelling tests of Experiments 1 and 3, and 
deficits were not obtained. A spelling strategy was suggested 
in the instructions for Experiment 2 and used by neutral 
subjects and subjects with induced depression alike. Last, a 
strategy was provided for recognition in Experiment 3. Nat­
urally depressed subjects made better use of the strategy than 
did subjects with induced depression. But the data from 
neutral subjects suggested that they had found yet another 
way to make their recognition judgments. In the following 
discussion of Experiments 1 -3, we review the major findings 
and relate them to the resource-allocation hypothesis. We 
follow that discussion with a limited review of the literatures 
on depressive deficits, with an aim of relating them to an 
initiative perspective. 
Experiments 1-3 
Deficits in Initiative 
Depressive deficits in recognition have rarely been docu­
mented; in most published experiments, researchers have used 
free recall as the test of memory. Nevertheless, we have shown 
some tendency toward depressive deficits in recognizing hom­
ophones. More to the point of these experiments, depressed 
subjects showed evidence of eschewing strategies for recogni­
tion that were adopted spontaneously by subjects in a neutral 
mood. 
In Experiments 1 and 3, when the instructions did not 
suggest ways of performing the spelling or recognition tasks, 
depressed subjects' performance on recognition did not de­
pend on whether or how they had spelled the previously 
presented homophones. In contrast, neutral subjects most 
frequently recognized tat:gets that they had spelled in line with 
the questions and missed the ones that they had spelled in the 
more common way. What might they have done, on their 
own volition, that would lead to such a pattern in their 
recognition data? 
The first locus of possible differences is the questioning 
task. Perhaps neutral subjects noticed homophones embedded 
within the questions. This opportunity for spontaneous proc­
essing can be de-emphasized because we did not find reliable 
effects as a consequence of manipulating mood before the 
questions. Another opportunity for spontaneous processing 
could be taken during the spelling test. Neutral subjects might 
have noticed targets from the questioning phase more fre­
quently that did depressed subjects. Such awareness, however, 
did not affect how they spelled homophones, in view of the 
fact that spelling performance did not reliably differ according 
to mood. But attention to the biased meanings of homo­
phones would serve as a second processing trial for the targets 
and make them more perspicuous on the recognition test. A 
different explanation of neutral subjects' performance points 
to strategic processing during recognition. Regardless of their 
awareness of targets during spelling, perhaps neutral subjects 
made recognition judgments by recalling how they had spelled 
homophones and by using the spelled meaning as a route tb 
retrieving the question. Last, some combination of these two 
strategies might have produced the neutral-mood advantage 
in recognizing spelled homophones. 
The Control of Strategies 
Spelling strategy. In Experiment 2 a strategy for spelling 
took the form of a suggestion that subjects might be helped 
on the spelling test if they thought about the questions. This 
suggestion elevated the effect of prior occurrence of homo­
phones because it turned the test of remembering without 
awareness into a test of remembering with awareness. (We did 
not use control groups to evaluate the size of the effect . of 
prior occurrence directly, but performance on both spelling 
and recognition tests was substantially better than in the other 
two experiments.) More to the point, the spelling strategy 
dramatically increased recognition conditionalized on spelling 
to levels not found in Experiments 1 and 3. All measures of 
the association of recognition and spelling performance 
showed that subjects with induced depression performed as 
well as neutral subjects. Again, perhaps neutral subjects in 
Experiment 1 had used this strategy spontaneously, noticing 
relations to the questions as they spelled the homophones; 
perhaps they did not. Regardless, the strategy was effective in 
reducing the differences between neutral subjects and subjects 
with induced depression on the recognition test. 
Recognition strategy. Half of the subjects in Experiment 
3 were directed to recall whether and how they had spelled 
each word before determining whether the word had occurred 
in a question; they were also asked to recall the question. This 
strategy improved recognition particularly for homophones 
and, independently, for items from the spelling test. For 
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naturally depressed subjects, the strategy established strong 
dependencies between spelling and recognition, whereas the 
improved recognition by neutral subjects under directed in­
structions suggested the use of still another strategy that we 
had not anticipated: the use of both meanings of the homo­
phones as routes for recognition judgments. 
Subjects with induced depression had performed as well as 
neutral subjects when provided with a spelling strategy in 
Experiment 2, but directing them to use a strategy during 
recognition did not substantially improve their ability to use 
spelling performance as a guide. These different outcomes 
imply that noticing the relation between the questions and 
the spelling words was a critical requirement for the use of an 
effective strategy for recognition. Depression-induced subjects 
did remember how they had spelled homophones from the 
question phase, but they did not appear to make the connec­
tion between homophones on the spelling test and homo­
phones in the questions. 
In the directed-recognition condition, the connection be­
tween spelled and questioned homophones could be made at 
two junctures: during spelling or when the subject was asked 
to remember a question that contained the spelled word. The 
results from the undirected task indicate that neither de­
pressed group noticed the connection during the spelling task; 
if they had done so, they should have performed as well as 
neutral subjects, according to the results of Experiment 2. On 
the other hand, the request to recall a question during recog­
nition provided a second opportunity to notice the link be­
tween the spelled and questioned homophones, but this re­
quest was the least constrained step in the procedure for 
directed recognition. By implying that subjects might not be 
able to recall a question ("Even if you cannot recall a question, 
please try to decide if the word occurred in the question 
phase"), the instructions permitted the final recognition judg­
ments to be made without attempts to recall questions. Why 
should subjects whose moods were induced take that "out" 
more frequently than would naturally depressed subjects? 
The answer to that question should be pursued in future 
research. Any account that is based on only one comparison 
between the two depressed groups is premature. Here, we 
tentatively suggest an approach that emphasizes possible mo­
tivational differences. If the mood-induction procedure pro­
duced lethargy, these subjects might have expended less effort 
in attempting to recall a question. Furthermore, they could 
have easily attributed their lack of motivation to the induction 
procedure and had a good excuse to expend little effort. 
Naturally depressed subjects, in contrast, would less likely 
suspect our interest in depression and performance, given that 
all measures of depression in these subjects occurred after the 
recognition task. And even if they did suspect, they lacked 
the convenience of the external attribution; their depression 
was a characteristic of self and not of experimental context. 
In short, naturally depressed subjects might have been more 
motivated to perform well. Last, in proposing these motiva­
tional differences, we emphasize that naturally depressed sub­
jects' tendency to attempt question recall was not a matter of 
initiating a strategy. The strategy was provided. Instead, it was 
a matter of motivation to use the provided strategy when it 
was not required. 
Initiative Versus Resource Allocation 
The roots of the resource-allocation account of depressive 
deficits are evident in research on naturally depressed popu­
lations and populations experiencing depression inductions. 
How do our findings inform this account? Clearly, spelling 
the words that we used is not an effortful task, and so no 
deficit would be expected. When the spelling test was con­
verted into a test of memory with awareness in Experiment 
2, the degree of effort required to relate the spelling words to 
the questions might not have been great enough to challenge 
the resources of subjects with induced depression. Yet the 
undirected recognition task was intuitively effortful for the 
participant; the proportion of affirmative responses to targets 
was modest under most conditions, and the intervening spell­
ing test added an important source of interference. The re­
source-allocation account can easily accommodate the find­
ings of deficits in undirected recognition but has greater 
difficulty adjusting to the conditions in which the deficits were 
eliminated (Experiment 2 and the directed condition of Ex­
periment 3). It would be difficult to surmise that directed 
recognition was easier, given the requests to recall both spell­
ings and questions before the recognition judgments. Al­
though we cannot reject this possibility on solid grounds 
because we have no independe11t measure of effort, it seems 
quite unlikely to us and to the experimenters. Indeed, many 
subjects complained that the directed task was frustrating. 
In their resource-allocation model, Ellis and Ashbrook 
( 1 988) predicted depressive deficits when tasks require greater 
degrees of cognitive effort. Our results, however, showed 
deficits (or at least differences) when greater effort was not 
required but merely possible. This distinction is important. 
Whereas Ellis and Ashbrook pointed to decrements in the 
effective use of cognitive strategies, they emphasized the re­
quirements of the task. We suggest a clearer focus on the 
meaning of strategy, which connotes the use of operations 
that are not specified or required to do the task. Moreover, 
the use of strategies might or might not be effortful, depending 
on the degree of their prior practice. Even the selection of a 
strategy could be made somewhat automatically, given its 
frequent use under similar circumstances. Clearly, the useful­
ness of both the resource-allocation hypothesis and the initi­
ative hypothesis depends on the development of these distinc­
tions in further research. 
Much of the evidence in support of the resource-allocation 
hypothesis was accrued from mood-induction procedures. 
Perhaps these procedures produce effects that differ from the 
cognitive concomitants of natural depression. Earlier, we 
interpreted such differences within a motivational framework. 
Although it is possible that inductions produce greater deple­
tions or reallocations of resources than do those accompany­
ing natural depression-that the induced mood is more in­
tense (see Ellis, 1 985)-our postexperimental interviews and 
the results from the DACL fail to confirm this hypothesis. 
But we wish to emphasize above all else the importance of 
comparing these two types of depressive moods in future 
research. If similarities are found, the manipulation of mood 
can reduce the ambiguity associated with the multifaceted 
syndrome of depression (see Ellis, 1 985). 
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Relation to the Literature on Depressive Deficits 
The literature on depressive deficits in remembering con­
tains (a) research on mood and memory in which depressive 
moods have been experimentally induced, (b) studies of the 
association of memory performance with scores on self-report 
instruments such as the BDI, and (c) memory research in 
which depressed patients served as subjects. In the following 
sections, we describe research selected from each of those 
categories and research on depression in literatures outside 
the concern with memory. Our purpose is to show that an 
initiative account of depressive deficits is consistent with a 
wide range of prior research. 
Mood Inductions 
Ellis and his students have provided the bulk of knowledge 
concerning deficits caused by the induction of depressed 
moods. In the first of such studies, Leight and Ellis ( 1981) 
demonstrated deficits in the learning of strategies for recalling 
letter strings. In one condition (varied input), the learning 
task encouraged but did not instruct for the discovery of 
higher order meaning in letter strings. However, in the con­
stant-input condition, such discovery was made more diffi­
cult, and learning was consequently retarded. After several 
study-recall trials with one list of items, subjects were trans­
ferred to a similar second task, under either varied or constant 
conditions. The important result for our purposes was that 
subjects who experienced a neutral mood and received varied 
input on the learning task detected the higher order meaning 
and transferred that strategy to the second task, regardless of 
their mood or the conditions of input during the second task. 
However, if subjects were depressed before the learning task, 
transfer performance was always worse. In a manner consist­
ent with an initiative account, a depressed mood prevented 
the detection of the optimal strategy, but once this strategy 
was discovered under neutral conditions, depressed subjects 
used it effectively. 
In later studies in Ellis's laboratory, a possible relation 
between depressed mood and the failure to use strategies could 
be merely inferred from the lack of constraint in their proc­
essing tasks. For example, Ellis et al. ( 1984, Experiment 3) 
found a depression-related deficit in free recall after an inci­
dental semantic processing task. In each processing trial, 
neutral subjects and subjects experiencing mood inductions 
were asked to choose a word that sensibly completed a sen­
tence. The incomplete sentence varied according to its diffi­
culty of completion. An unexpected test of free recall was 
administered after the processing task and revealed a depres­
sive deficit for words chosen for the more difficult sentences 
but not for words chosen for the easy ones. To Ellis et al., 
these results indicated that depressed subjects possessed insuf­
ficient resources to perform well under more difficult proc­
essing conditions. From our perspective, the subjects seemed 
capable making those more difficult decisions (i.e., "Does the 
word dream fit into He was awakened by the frightening 
__ ?"); the error rate was low. We suggest that depressed 
subjects might not have attended carefully to the materials 
beyond making the decision. The procedures were sufficiently 
relaxed that they would be susceptible to attentional strategies 
spontaneously elected by subjects in a neutral mood. 
Last, there are a few reports of failures to find depressive 
deficits with induction procedures. Ellis and Lane (cited by 
Ellis, 1 985) found no decrements in the recall of generated 
words. The generating procedure might constrain processing 
to the degree that other strategies would not occur to nonde� 
pressed subjects. Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro ( 198 1) and 
Einstein and Ellis (cited by Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988) failed to 
find depressive deficits in recalling stories or expository text. 
Such failures suggest that texts provided depressed subjects 
with sufficient structure or that nondepressed subjects might 
not have developed special strategies for remembering texts 
and therefore failed to show an advantage over the depressed 
subjects. These suggestions for how previous research on 
mood inductions can be viewed from an initiative perspective 
are quite tentative. But they do offer directions for future 
investigations. 
Naturally Depressed Students 
Hasher and Zacks ( 1 979) were perhaps the first investigators 
to propose that depressive deficits emerge primarily in effort­
ful processing tasks. In their Experiment 4, depressed and 
nondepressed college students (categorized by BDI scores) 
performed an incidental semantic task, followed by recogni­
tion. The depressed subjects made fewer associative errors in 
recognition, which indicates that they processed the target 
words less elaboratively on the incidental task. As the authors 
suggested, low levels of elaboration might be attributed to a 
reduction in cognitive capacity. Yet the lack of associative 
errors might also reflect reduced initiative to go beyond the 
requirements of their incidental task. 
In later work, Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, and Doren ( 1 985) 
assessed depression in college students in a number of ways, 
including the BDI, and found no depressive deficits in the 
recall of stories. They concluded that studying stories of the 
type that they used is perhaps a task that is not difficult 
enough to show effort-related deficits. It may also be the case 
that studying those stories was not as susceptible to the 
spontaneous use of uninstructed strategies as are other tasks, 
and so the lack of a deficit would reflect a lack of initiative 
on the part of the nondepressed subjects. 
Little research with naturally depressed college students has 
produced clear evidence of depressive deficits, and occasion­
ally evidence of a depressive advantage has been recorded (see 
Hasher et al., 1985). Such an advantage in free recall was 
found by Hertel and Rude ( 1 989), who attempted to replicate 
the results of Ellis et al. ( 1984, Experiment 3) with naturally 
depressed students rather than students with induced depres­
sion and with a more tightly constrained processing task. The 
target was displayed for 1 s only and was reported by the 
subjects at the end of the 8-s sentence display. Also, during 
these trials, a brief and slightly audible tone typically sounded. 
The subject's primary task was to decide whether the word fit 
sensibly into the sentence, and the secondary task was to press 
a button as soon as possible in response to the tone. The 
secondary tone-detection task served as a probe for the 
amount of available effort; longer latencies to respond to the 
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tone were offered as indices that fewer resources were available 
or that more resources were allocated to the primary task (see 
Tyler et al., 1 979). The dependent measures in this experiment 
were the median latencies to respond to the probe for cognitive 
effort and the number of words produced on the unexpected 
test of free recall. 
Depressed subjects took reliably longer to respond to the 
tone than did nondepressed subjects. At first blush, their 
longer reaction times might indicate that depression limited 
the amount of available resources and consequently post­
poned responses to the probe. One competing explanation for 
the longer latencies concerns possible motor retardation as­
sociated with depression, but it was eliminated in a subsequent 
experiment. A third and more compelling explanation rests 
on the results of the free-recall test: Depressed subjects actually 
recalled reliably higher percentages of items than did nonde­
pressed subjects. The similar patterns in latencies and recall 
suggest that depressed subjects' capacity was allocated to the 
primary task, rather than being limited by depression. More­
over, processing words in the more difficult contexts produced 
longer latencies and better memory in both groups. These 
results obviously failed to show the deficit that was obtained 
by Ellis et al. ( 1984) when depression was induced. Why? 
Possible explanations are related to differences between in­
duced and natural depression and to different degrees of 
constraint in the processing task, but further research must 
resolve those issues. 
Depression Measured by Diagnostic Criteria 
Clinicians have suggested caution in interpreting results 
from studies in which self-reported measures of depression 
(such as the BDI) are used without accompanying diagnostic 
procedures, because the BDI was not designed for diagnostic 
purposes (see Depue & Monroe, 1 978). In this light, Hertel 
and Rude ( 1 989) interviewed their subjects and selected those 
who met research diagnostic criteria for depression. Yet the 
majority of memory investigations with carefully screened 
depressed subjects have been conducted with patients or 
outpatients who are not college students (see the review by 
Johnson & Magaro, 1 987). 
The work of Weingartner and his associates dominates this 
category of research on memory deficits. In a frequently cited 
set of experiments with hospitalized depressed subjects and 
control subjects, Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, and 
Gerdt ( 198 1 )  manipulated the inherent and apparent organi­
zation of a list of words to be recalled. They obtained clear 
evidence that depressed subjects poorly detected, constructed, 
or used organization in list learning, but it is unclear whether 
they suffered the loss of capacity for organizing or the loss of 
initiative (also see Russell & Beekhuis, 1 976). 
In a more direct examination of capacity issues, Krames 
and MacDonald ( 1985) used a highly structured dual-proc­
essing task with varying degrees of cognitive load. Their results 
support an initiative hypothesis because they showed that 
depressed outpatients recalled more words from the beginning 
of the list under high loads than under low loads, but the 
reverse was true for the nondepressed outpatients. Krames 
and MacDonald concluded that as task-relevant demands 
increase, depressed people allocate less attention to depressive 
ruminations. Thus allocation of capacity might be better 
understood as controlled by task demands, rather than con­
sistently hampered by depression. 
Other Research on Depression 
Outside the literature on memory, there are numerous 
references to depressive deficits in initiative. Retarded initia­
tion of voluntary action serves as the motivational component 
in learned helplessness models of depression (see Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1 978). For example, Abramson, Alloy, 
and Rosoff ( 198 1 )  found depressive deficits in generating 
hypotheses for solving complex problems, but the deficits 
disappeared when a list of hypotheses was provided by the 
experimenter. In reviews of learned helplessness research and 
other models of depression, Coyne and Gotlib ( 1 983) and 
Rehm ( 1 982) related lack of initiative to deficits in self­
monitoring and self-control. 
Self-monitoring, according to Stuss and Benson ( 1986), is 
one of the activities of the prefrontal lobes, which are impli­
cated in "nonroutine, novel situations that require new solu­
tions" (p. 244). Frontal lobe functions are also loosely related 
to depression. Damasio and Van Hoesen ( 1 983) and Schacter 
( 1 987) reviewed evidence for a link between frontal lobe 
damage, affective disturbance, and problems in planning, 
initiation, and maintenance of action. In short, neuropsycho­
logical research points to an area of the brain, the prefrontal 
region, that is implicated in depression and in deficits in 
processing initiative. But the possibility of such a linkage must 
be cautiously considered because the work is correlational 
and because many of the functions of the frontal lobes are 
served by other areas (Mayeux, 1 983). 
Directions and Implications 
In a set ofthree experiments, we have sought to demonstrate 
the usefulness of a focus on initiative for understanding 
depressive deficits in remembering. The experiments included 
conditions for spontaneous, bypassed, and directed use of 
strategies within the context of spelling and recognition tests. 
Future research should be designed to explore the usefulness 
of an initiative account in other memory paradigms and 
attempt a more precise specification of the nature of the 
deficit, relating it to motivational accounts of depression. 
Last, an emphasis on deficits in initiative might have useful 
implications for the treatment of depression. Knowing that 
depressed people can expend cognitive effort in processing 
tasks but often lack the initiative to do so, we might recom­
mend that they engage in well-structured tasks instead of 
resigning them to function on low capacity. The therapeutic 
advantage is a short circuit in the spiral of depression: Well­
structured tasks serve as distractions from depressive musings, 
and success in these tasks should produce therapeutic feelings 
of competence. 
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